Voluntarily Unlocking the Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent Decrees in School Desegregation by Schoene, Kathleen Snyder
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 
January 1982 
Voluntarily Unlocking the Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class 
Action Consent Decrees in School Desegregation 
Kathleen Snyder Schoene 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen Snyder Schoene, Voluntarily Unlocking the Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent 
Decrees in School Desegregation, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 1305 (1982). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
VOLUNTARILY UNLOCKING THE SCHOOLHOUSE
DOOR: THE USE OF CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREES IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
Twenty-eight years after the Supreme Court declared racially dual
school systems unconstitutional,' many students still attend segregated
public schools. 2 As a result of social, economic, and demographic
forces,' urban school systems may in fact be more racially segregated
today than in 1954. City school districts in metropolitan centers fre-
quently have a high percentage of black students and a correspond-
ingly low percentage of white students. In surrounding suburban
schools, however, the converse is true.4 Because school districts are
generally coterminous with political boundaries, intradistrict desegre-
gation alone cannot achieve racial balance in urban communities. The
only effective remedy is to alter the boundary lines between city and
suburban school systems by either transferring students among school
districts or consolidating districts.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court said:
[Ijn the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Sep-
arate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated. . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of, de-
prived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
Id at 495.
2. Data from the fall, 1976 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey con-
ducted by the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health, Education &
Welfare showed that nearly 50% of all minority school children attended schools with moderate to
high levels of segregation. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATION OF THE NA-
TION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A STATUS REPORT 21 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DESEGREGATION STA-
TUS REPORT]. The survey used an index of segregation ranging from 0.0, indicating no
segregation within a school district, to 1.0, indicating complete segregation. Moderate segregation
had an index of 0.20 to 0.49, and an index of 0.50 or greater indicated a high level of segregation.
Id at 19.
3. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 480 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. The nonwhite student population in city schools in 1977 was over 60% in Cleveland;
Dade County, Florida; Kansas City, Missouri; and Los Angeles; over 70% in Baltimore, Chicago,
New York City, and St. Louis; and over 80% in Atlanta and Detroit. DESEGREGATION STATUS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 28-66. By contrast, the nonwhite suburban population in 1970 was three
percent in Baltimore and Chicago and four percent in Detroit. W. TAYLOR, STATEMENT ON MEr-
ROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 15 (1977).
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One means of achieving racial balance is through court-ordered in-
terdistrict desegregation.' The only United States Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on this subject came in Milliken v. Bradley. The Court
held that, absent constitutional violations by surrounding school dis-
tricts, a federal district court abused its remedial discretion by ordering
a multi-district remedy for unconstitutional segregation by a single-dis-
trict. Milliken did not, however, bar multi-district remedies in those
cases in which the effects of the unconstitutional segregation extend be-
yond district limits.7 Since that decision, both federal and state courts
have found such remedies necessary to rectify multi-district
segregation.8
Two recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the continued
commitment of the Court to effectuate remediation of de jure segrega-
tion,9 at least in the single-district context, and may allow plaintiffs in
school desegregation cases to establish a need for interdistrict relief. In
5. Interdistrict and multi-district school desegregation cross the boundary lines of two or
more districts. Intra-district and single-district desegregation are confined to one school district.
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. Id at 744-45. See Kanner, Interdistrict Remedies/or School Desegregation after Milliken
v. Bradley and Hills v. Gautreaux, 48 Miss. L.J. 33 (1977); Levin & Moise, School Desegregation
Litigation in the Seventies and the Use ofSocial Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 50 (1975); Manley, School Desegregation in the North: A Post-Milliken Strategy
for Obtaining Metropolitan Relief, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 585 (1976); Sedler, Metropolitan Desegrega-
tion in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely
From Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535; Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban Reality: 4 Tactical
Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 751 (1975); Note, Interdistrict Desegregation:
The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REv. 521 (1976). But cf. Comment, Milliken v. Bradley in
HistoricalPerspective. The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 799 (1974) (Mdi-
ken ends possibility of remedying segregation and represents a departure from earlier law).
8. Morrillton School Dist. No. 32 v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979) (ordering
interdistrict remedies), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365
(8th Cir.) (en bane) (ordering consolidation of three school districts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951
(1975); Newberg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (ordering
interdistrict remedies), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Berry v. School Dist., 467 F. Supp. 721
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (ordering defendants to submit remedies for interdistrict violations); School
Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (refusing to dismiss plaintiff's suit for in-
terdistrict relief on defendant's motion made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), appeal dismissed, 592
F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind.
1978) (ordering interdistrict remedies); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.) (ordering
interdistrict remedies), af'dmena, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); Tinsley v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist.,
91 Cal. App. 3d 871, 154 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1979) (upholding plaintiffs suit for interdistrict remedy
on demurrer).
9. Dejure segregation results from intentional state action. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. I,
413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973). By contrast, de facto segregation exists as a matter of fact but does not
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Columbus Board of Education v. Penick 10 and Dayton Board of Educa-
tion v. Brinkman (Dayton 1I)," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the pre-
sumption, announced in earlier cases, 12 of a causal nexus between past
segregative practices and current segregation, and it thereby lessened
the burden of proving causation.1 3  Plaintiffs who can demonstrate,
therefore, that the effects of past constitutional violations extend over
several school districts should be entitled to remedies for the present
vestiges of segregation.' 4
Voluntary plans for interdistrict desegregation are viable alternatives
to court-ordered plans for communities faced with litigation. As the
use of court-ordered interdistrict remedies has increased, the federal
government has urged school districts to develop areawide desegrega-
tion plans voluntarily. 5 To date, Wisconsin and Massachusetts have
10. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
11. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
12. In Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Supreme Court first adopted presumptions as to causation in
defining the scope of the duty to desegregate. In Swann, the Court held that a school board that
operated, by law, a dual system for black and white students in 1954 had a duty to eliminate all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation in 1970. The Court presumed a causal link between the past
discrimination condemned by Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954), and the current
segregation in the school district. 402 U.S. at 26. In Keyes, the Court held that past intentional
segregation in a substantial portion of the school district established a presumption that the school
board was operating an unconstitutional dual system. 413 U.S. at 201. Unless rebutted by the
district, this presumption triggers the Swann presumption of a causal connection between the past
discrimination and the current segregation. Id at 210-11. By combining these two presumptions,
the Court in Keyes established a broader presumption of a causal nexus between substantial past
segregation and current segregation.
13. The presumption between past and current segregation is difficult to rebut. Defendants
in desegregation cases must trace the chain of causation to establish that the former segregative
practices did not contribute to the present conditions. See Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncer-
tain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 1, 19-26 (1974).
The Supreme Court appeared to retreat from this presumption in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977). In that case, the evidence proved only the existence of
isolated instances of segregation. Because evidence did not justify systemwide measures, the
Court limited the relief to correcting the incremental segregative effects shown. Id at 420. The
implication was that future plaintiffs would have to demonstrate a causal relationship between
past discrimination and current segregation. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443
U.S. 526 (1976), and Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), however, reject this
expansive reading of Dayton I, for in those cases the Court relied on the presumption that current
segregation is attributable to past segregative acts.
14. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1979); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979).
15. See W. TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 116; DESEGREOATION STATUS REPORT, supra note 2, at
27.
There are indications, however, that this federal encouragement of school desegregation may be
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responded with statutes designed to promote interdistrict desegrega-
tion.16 Although no school system has implemented a voluntary multi-
district plan, 7 many systems have developed and implemented vol-
untary single-district plans.'" As the advantages of these plans gain
waning under the Reagan administration. In September 1981, the United States Department of
Justice decided to reverse its position ofsupport for voluntary desegregation by Seattle area school
districts. In 1978, after the three Seattle area school boards voluntarily adopted busing programs,
citizens opposing the programs passed a statewide ballot initiative. The law forbids school dis-
tricts from requiring students to attend any school other than the one nearest or next nearest their
residence except for reasons of health, safety, or special needs of the student. The three school
boards and the Justice Department successfully challenged the initiative as unconstitutional be-
cause it created a suspect racial classification. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 473 F.
Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979), af§'d, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), cerl. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3266
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-9). The Justice Department informed the Supreme Court prior to the
granting of certiorari that it had changed its mind and now believed the ban on busing to be
constitutional. N.Y. Times, October 14, 1981, at 11, col. 1. The Justice Department similarly
decided not to appeal a district court order, United States v. Houston Independent School Dist.,
No. 10-444 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 1981), dismissing its suit seeking multi-district desegregation of the
public schools in Houston and surrounding suburbs.
16. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 12A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978) (promoting metropolitan
remedies through a system of magnet schools); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 121.85 (West Supp. 1980) (pro-
moting interdistrict transfers through provisions of incentives to the transferring student and the
receiving school district).
17. Efforts to implement voluntary interdistrict plans are currently being explored in St.
Louis. In Liddell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980), af d, No. 80-1458 (8th Cir.
Feb. 13, 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981) (No. 80-2152), the court held
that the St. Louis public schools unconstitutionally segregated students and ordered a systemwide
plan for the integration of the schools. The court also ordered the school board to seek the coop-
eration of the suburban school districts of St. Louis County in developing a voluntary desegrega-
tion program. Id at 353. Efforts to effectuate a voluntary plan between the city and suburban
school districts began in September 1980. In January 1981, the St. Louis Board of Education and
the NAACP filed amended complaints to include in the suit 40 suburban school districts in St.
Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson Counties. Cross-Claim for Defendant, Liddell v. Board of Educ.,
No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo., filed Jan. 9, 1981). After five school districts in St. Louis County
agreed to participate in a voluntary plan, the court stayed the motions to include those districts in
the suit but granted the motions to add the remaining 18 districts in St. Louis County as parties to
the suit. The court stayed the motions to include the districts in Jefferson and St. Charles Counties
pending an evidentiary hearing. Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. Aug. 24,
1981) (order granting in part and denying in part the addition of cross-claims and parties).
18. Anchorage, Alaska; Colorado Springs, Colorado; Portland, Oregon; Providence, Rhode
Island; Seattle, Washington; and Tacoma, Washington are among the school systems in which
public school authorities have developed voluntary plans. DESEGREGATION STATUS REPORT,
supra note 2, at 26-71. In addition, several school districts have entered voluntary settlements of
litigation. See, eg., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tucson school
system), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Board of Educ., 560 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir.
1977) (Waterbury, Conn. school system); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp.
800 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aft'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980) (Milwaukee school system).
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recognition, the use of both single- and multi-district voluntary plans in
desegregation cases will increase.
School districts can implement voluntary desegregation plans with-
out any judicial involvement or legal determination of the merits of the
plan. In practice, however, most school districts have little incentive to
implement voluntary plans without either the threat of impending liti-
gation or the assurance that implementation will preclude future suits.
Judicial involvement is necessary to provide this assurance.
Voluntary desegregation plans, if negotiated and approved as class
action consent decrees, offer several advantages to school systems faced
with possible court-ordered desegregation, including avoidance of pro-
tracted litigation, implementation of a plan acceptable to many resi-
dents, and protection against future claims of segregation. 19 Voluntary
resolution in school desegregation is preferable to full litigation be-
cause the cooperation inherent in a settlement ensures the long-range
success of the desegregation plan.20
Because settlements necessarily involve extra-judicial negotiations
and procedures, and because the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure gov-
erning class action settlements is broadly written,21 few guidelines for
implementing these decrees exist. Parties to settlement decrees must
undertake the implementation carefully to assure maximum binding ef-
19. Current proposals for congressional enactment of antibusing legislation may reduce the
incentive for suburban school districts to participate in voluntary interdistrict desegregation plans.
The constitutionality of such legislation, however, is doubtful. Though Congress can enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment by appropriate legislation, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5,
it cannot reduce the scope of rights conferred or the protection guaranteed by the amendment.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 127 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966). Moreover, although Congress is authorized to remove certain types of cases from the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, U.S. CON sT. art. III, § 2, it cannot limit the remedies
available to the courts. Once Congress has conferred jurisdiction, the separation of powers doc-
trine commands that the courts be free to determine the rights of, and relief due, the litigants
without interference from the other branches of government. See, eg., Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 168-69 (1943); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 403 (1932); Gordon v.
United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1864); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792).
Furthermore, even if Congress could limit the remedies available in school desegregation cases,
prohibition of busing would be tantamount to an unconstitutional denial of equal protection if
busing is the only means of effectively desegregating a school system. For an in-depth discussion
of these issues, see Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REv.
405, 437-50 (1973).
20. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 318 (7th Cir. 1980).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
Number 4] 1309
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fect and maximum accommodation of disparate community interests.
This Note examines the legal procedure for implementing voluntary
desegregation plans as class action consent decrees and both the bind-
ing effect and content of the decrees. The goal is to delineate a proce-
dure that will both foster a cooperative desegregation spirit through
settlement and adequately protect the interests of all class members.
I. PROCEDURE
A consent decree is a court-approved agreement between parties that
possesses the same legal force and character as a judgment decreed by a
court after a fully litigated trial.22 Like a judgment, a consent decree is
res judicata23 as to the parties.24 Moreover, collateral estoppel 25 may
22. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932); United States v. Home-
stake Mining Co., 595 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1979); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Southwood, 76 F.R.D.
115, 123 (D.R.I. 1977); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J. Super. 419, 426, 119
A.2d 172, 175 (1955); In re Pennsylvania Stave Co., 225 Pa. 178, 180, 73 A. 1107, 1108 (1909). See
generally James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1959); Note,
The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314,
1316-17 (1959).
23. In Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876), Justice Field defined the doctrine of
res judicata as follows:
[T]he judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent
action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and
those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose .... Such demand or claim, having passed into
judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at
law upon any ground whatever.
Id at 352-53.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S.
20 (1882); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Reynolds v. International
Harvester Co., 141 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1955), af'd, 233 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1956); United
States v. RCA, 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed on motion of appellant, 318 U.S.
796 (1943); Hinderlider v. Town of Berthoud, 77 Colo. 504, 238 P. 64 (1925); Louden Co. v. Town
of Berthoud, 57 Colo. 374, 140 P. 802 (1914).
The reasons for according the effect of res judicata to consent decrees are the same as those with
regard to judgments: economy of judicial resources, avoidance of harassment of the parties, and
avoidance of inconsistent results. Furthermore, the objection that resjudicata perpetuates errone-
ous judicial decisions is inapplicable to consent decrees. See Note, supra note 22, at 1320.
25. Collateral estoppel, a narrower form of res judicata, precludes relitigation of the same
issue in a new cause of action. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876). This
doctrine once required mutual estoppel; that is, unless the judgment bound both parties in an
earlier action, neither party could invoke collateral estoppel in a later one. See, e.g., Buckeye
Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918); Bigelow v. Old
Dominion Copper Co., 235 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/9
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apply to both legal issues the parties intend to resolve and questions of
fact determined by the court.26 A consent decree, however, does not
have legally binding effect beyond the immediate parties unless entered
as a class action settlement.27 Thus, for example, a desegregation con-
sent decree among school boards, or among school boards and the fed-
eral government, if entered in a non-class action lawsuit, 2 does not
Generally, however, mutuality of estoppel is no longer necessary. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
The use of collateral estoppel may be either defensive or offensive, depending upon which party
invokes the doctrine. When a defendant seeks to estop a plaintiff from asserting a claim that the
plaintiff previously had litigated unsuccessfully against another party, the use of the doctrine is
defensive. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-
30 (1971). Conversely, when a plaintiff seeks to prevent a defendant from asserting a claim that
the defendant had previously litigated unsuccessfully against another party, the use of collateral
estoppel is offensive. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 329. Although a defendant
may always invoke collateral estoppel, a plaintiffs use of the doctrine is subject to the trial court's
discretion. Id at 331. One important factor that the court will consider in exercising its discretion
is whether the party against whom the offensive collateral estoppel is asserted had a fair opportu-
nity in the prior action to be heard on the issue. Id at 33 1-32.
26. Because collateral estoppel normally applies only to those issues that parties have liti-
gated, application of collateral estoppel to consent decrees, which contemplate issue resolution
without litigation, may constitute unfair surprise. Application of collateral estoppel in this situa-
tion, therefore, demands a substitute for litigation and judicial determination. One acceptable
substitute is the intention of the parties to preclude subsequent claims. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc.
v. Leco Eng'r & Mach. Inc., 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. George F.
McCourt Trucking, Inc., 277 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1960); FruehaufTrailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d
324 (10th Cir. 1948); IB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.444[l], at 4008, 0.444, at 4020 (2d ed.
1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973);
James, supra note 22, at 193; Note, supra note 22, at 1320-21. See also Lawlor v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955). Thus, a well-drafted consent decree should contain a statement
that the parties intend to create the effect of collateral estoppel.
27. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th
Cir. 1976); Jeter v. Kerr, 429 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
28. The United States Department of Justice and the Chicago Board of Education entered
into a consent decree outlining general principles to guide the school board in developing a consti-
tutionally acceptable desegregation plan. United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 24, 1980) (order entering consent decree). The decree averted a threatened suit by the
Justice Department, but because Chicago students and their parents were not parties to the decree,
they are not bound by it. United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (order
denying motion for intervention). Cf. General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980)
(relief obtained under EEOC judgment or settlement against employer is not binding on all em-
ployees with discrimination grievances); Ward v. Arkansas State Police, No. 80-1808 (8th Cir. July
10, 1981) (consent decree in a non-class action between the federal government and employer does
not bar the potential beneficiaries of the decree from individually pursuing Title VII remedies);
United States v. Louisiana, No. 80-3300 (E.D. La. May 21, 1981) (order denying motion to inter-
vene) (entry of possible consent decree for school desegregation will not bind parties denied inter-
vention on res judicata grounds).
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afford the parties immunity against future suits by school children and
their parents. Only by incorporating the consent decree into the settle-
ment of a class action desegregation suit is such immunity from future
suits possible.29
The law generally favors voluntary resolution of controversy.30 This
preference applies even to litigation involving fundamental constitu-
tional rights.31 Though the importance of the rights involved and of
the various policies implicated requires that courts carefully evaluate
settlements in such cases, these considerations need not override the
policy favoring settlements.32 Indeed, courts have often recognized
29. A court order resolving a desegregation class action is binding upon all of the members of
a properly constituted and represented class named in the petition, including those who have
neither appeared nor participated in the action. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1921); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 288 (8th Cir. 1978);
EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264, 1268 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1789 (1972). This general rule applies
equally to a class action settlement because Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires court approval of any such settlement prior to compromise or dismissal of a class action.
See notes 83-113 infra and accompanying text.
The major purpose of class litigation is the realization of substantive policies for large numbers
of people. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1298-99 (1976). Negotiation and settlement seriously threaten this purpose unless privately con-
trolled decisions are harmonized with public interests. Consistency between adjudicated and ne-
gotiated resolutions can be attained only if parties submit their settlements for judicial approval.
This precaution is especially important if the settlement results in a decree that will modify the
behavior of class members, for the policy that all affected interests be heard in shaping the relief
exists whether the decree is the result of settlement or adjudication. See Magana v. Platzer Ship-
yard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1318, 1336-37 (1976). See also Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Co., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.
1976); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.21 (1977); Dole, The Settlement of Class Actionsfor
Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 971, 976 (1971).
30. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1980); Airline Stew-
ards Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876
(1978); United States v. McInnes, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d
108, 112 (7th Cir. 1976); Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976); DuPuy v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs,
519 F.2d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976); Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v.
Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960).
31. See Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 317 (7th Cir. 1980) (school
desegregation case resolved by class action settlement); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Title VII employment discrimination case resolved by class action settlement); Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 846 (N.D. IUl. 1979)
(discriminatory zoning case resolved by consent decree), aj#'d, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980); Wil-
liamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (Fair Housing Act housing discrimination case resolved by class action settlement).
32. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 317 (7th Cir. 1980).
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that the community support inherent in remedies reached by settlement
may more effectively implement the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection than will a court-ordered remedy that the community might
view as imposed by outsiders.33
Settlements are both prevalent and acceptable in the class action
context. 34 Class actions often involve complex disputes that present se-
rious problems of management and expense. 35  Settlements minimize
the litigation costs of both parties36 and reduce the burden imposed by
class action suits on judicial resources.37 Moreover, in fully litigated
actions seeking complex structural injunctions, courts frequently rely
on a process of negotiation between the parties in drafting the final
decree. 38 The school desegregation context requires such negotiation
by the parties. In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II),39 the United
States Supreme Court held that school authorities, not the courts, bear
the primary responsibility for clarifying, assessing, and resolving deseg-
regation problems. The role of the courts is to determine whether
school authorities are acting in good faith to implement constitutional
principles. 40 To extend the public policy favoring class action settle-
ments to the school desegregation context, therefore, is consistent with
the judicial requirement for active party participation.
Racial discrimination is, by definition, class discrimination.4 The
claim in a desegregation suit is more than one of invidious discrimina-
tion against individuals. Rather, it is a claim of discrimination against
a class as a whole.42 To be effective, then, the remedy sought must
provide for structural injunctive relief that will eliminate the unconsti-
33. Id at 318; United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1979); Metropoli-
tan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aft'd,
616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980); Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
450 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. Most class actions for damages are settled or dismissed before trial. See Developments in
the Law Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1373 n.5.
35. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1980); Cotton v.
Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. See, e.g., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 87 (1981) ("[slettlement agree-
ments may. . . be predicated on an express or implied condition that the parties would, by their
agreement, be able to avoid the costs and uncertainties of litigation").
37. Id See also Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976).
38. Developments in the Law-ClassActions, supra note 29, at 1536.
39. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. Id at 299.
41. Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 64 F.R.D. 351, 357-59 (D. Pa. 1974).
42. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289 n.5 (5th Cir. 1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,
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tutional practices with respect to the entire class. In a school desegre-
gation case, a consent decree entered in a class action lawsuit best
accomplishes this goal. Parties may maintain a school desegregation
suit as a class action by virtue of Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action in appropriate
cases4 3 in which the party opposing the class has acted on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief ap-
propriate with respect to the class as a whole.' In proposing this Rule
as part of the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,45 the Advisory Committee specifically contemplated its use in de-
segregation cases.46 Indeed, the Committee cited Potts v. Flax,47 a
school desegregation case, as illustrative of a situation in which Rule
23(b)(2) would apply.4"
A. Certffcation of the Class
Judicial certification of the named class49 under Rule 23(c)(1)50 is the
308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir.), modfied on rehearing, 308 F.2d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 1962). See also
Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1962).
43. A Rule 23(b)(2) class action, to be maintained as such, first must meet the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a), which states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
44. Rule 23(b)(2) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) [see
note 43 supra] are satisfied, and in addition: . . . (2) the party opposing the class has
acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final re-
lief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
45. See Advisory Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
46. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23(b)(2) state: "Illustrative are various actions in
the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usu-
ally one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration." Id
47. 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
48. Advisory Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
49. Composition of the class will vary from case to case, but the plaintiffs in school desegre-
gation cases are generally either all black students and their parents, see, e.g., Adams v. Baldwin
County Bd. of Educ,, 628 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1980); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 912 (1981), or all students (both black and white) and their
parents, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980); Hines v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1972). The latter class is recommended in order
to provide for maximum public participation.
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first, and perhaps the most important, step in a class action lawsuit.
Though desegregation cases are illustrative of Rule 23(b)(2) actions,51
they do not qualify per se as class actions. Rather, they must meet the
same requirements 52 as any other type of class action. 3
The question of certification is difficult and may take years to resolve
in a particular case. 4 Parties to a proposed class action, therefore,
often will be tempted to begin, and even to conclude, settlement negoti-
ations before certification is complete. 5 Although courts have author-
ized the formation of a "tentative" class for the purpose of settlement,56
this procedure is not recommended in a suit intended to bring about
voluntary school desegregation. A voluntary plan necessarily will af-
fect a large number of people and must reflect the various interests in-
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides that: "As soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits."
51. See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 43 supra.
53. East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977); Shelton v. Pargo, 582
F.2d 1298, 1312 (4th Cir. 1978); A. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 14 (1977).
54. A. MILLER, supra note 53, at 60.
55. This practice is particularly prevalent in the Title VII employment discrimination area, in
which settlements are often filed simultaneously with the suit. See, e.g., United States v. Alle-
gheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aft'd, 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a'd, 506 F.2d
735 (3d Cir. 1974).
There are two justifications for this practice in the Title VII area. First, the statute itself, Title
VII, §§ 701-718, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I to -17 (1976 & Supp. III
1979), provides the mechanism for settlement. An individual or a member of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission must first file a charge with the Commission. Through its investi-
gatory powers, the Commission then determines whether reasonable cause exists to believe that a
violation of the statute has occurred. If such cause is found, the Commission must attempt concil-
iation prior to either issuing a "right to sue" letter or filing suit itself. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976
& Supp. III 1979). If negotiations result in an agreement, the parties then apply for court approval
of the settlement. See Note, Consent Decrees: Can They Withstandthe Charge ofReverse Discrimi-
nation?, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 115, 120 (1979).
The second justification for such settlements is that most Title VII class action suits are brought
under Rule 23(b)(3). This Rule provides for potential class members to "opt out" of the suit and
thus not be bound by the judgment. This option is not available to Rule 23(b)(2) class members.
56. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy
Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 1974);
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971); Alaniz v. California
Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269, 275 (N.D. Cal.), modfed on motion of theparties, 73 F.R.D. 289
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324,327 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
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volved to succeed. A tentative class, however, runs a high risk of
inadequately representing the interests of its absent members because
the parties may not have identified the range of interests involved prior
to certification." For this reason, settlement negotiations should
remain fluid pending final certification of the proposed class.
Rule 23(c)(1) mandates that the court determine "[a]s soon as practi-
cable" whether a proposed class action may be maintained as such. 8
Increasingly, appellate courts have interpreted the quoted language to
mean "very quickly. '59 When parties seek to incorporate a voluntary
school desegregation plan into a class action consent decree, however,
the trial court should resist the pressure for rapid certification so as to
assure maximum public participation in the process. Because the pri-
mary purpose of submitting a voluntary plan to class action settlement
procedures is to foreclose the possibility of future litigation,6" the final
effect is to deny otherwise entitled individuals access to the courts.
Consequently, adjudication of the suit must assure that the interests of
absent members will in fact receive due consideration. A court can best
provide this assurance by eliciting broad public response. This, in turn,
may require restructuring of the traditional certification process.61
To guarantee that a proposed class adequately represents all con-
cerned members, the certification process should focus on the informa-
tion available regarding that class, particularly its absent members.
The pleadings alone seldom reveal such information because the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure do not require highly specific pleadings. 62
Furthermore, at the pleading stage the parties may not know the range
of interests. For example, all class members may agree that a defend-
ant has violated their constitutional rights by failing to desegregate a
school system effectively, yet the members may disagree on the appro-
57. The Manual for Complex Litigation concludes that tentative classes "should never be
formed." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 29, § 1.46, at 43.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
59. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1422.
60. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
61. The traditional certification decision is based on the pleadings or on a limited amount of
discovery information. See Developments in the Law-ClassActions, supra note 29, at 1422-23 nn.
175 & 176.
62. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim"); Dioguardi
v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[u]nder the. . . rules of civil procedure, there is
. . . only [the requirement] that there be a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief').
[Vol. 59:1305
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priate remedy.63 A court, therefore, must thoroughly canvass the inter-
ests of a proposed class early in the proceedings, while the situation is
still fluid and before the absentees must contend with an already nego-
tiated agreement.'
Verification of desegregation suit pleadings through a form of dis-
covery will generally accomplish these goals.65 The trial court first
schedules an initial hearing to determine the status of the suit and to
begin the discovery process. 66 This process may include both ordinary
discovery by the parties and a preliminary survey of the proposed class
by the court. The court may conduct this survey by way of a question-
naire sent either to the class as a whole or to a random sample of
members.67
After discovery, the court schedules a second hearing, or a series of
hearings, in which it will hear the product of discovery and determine
the proper class structure.68 Notice of this hearing to proposed class
members is appropriate 69 to ensure that an adequate cross section of
absentees participates in the suit.70 The publicity normally surround-
ing a school desegregation suit may provide such notice if it is supple-
mented by a publicized process by which interested parties may express
their views to the court.
71
63. See, e.g., East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977)
(split over desirability of merging seniority lists in fully litigated Title VII case); Calhoun v. Cook,
522 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975) (split over appropriate remedy to correct past school
segregation).
64. See notes 111-13 infra and accompanying text.
65. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1429.
66. Id at 1432.
67. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court
supervised sampling of class members prior to discovery), a f'd sub nom. Pfitzer, Inc. v. Lord, 449
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 108, 112-14 (E.D.N.Y.
1969) (court used interrogatory to survey class members in order to assess need for preliminary
relief).
68. Determining the class structure may include the use of subclassification and intervention.
See notes 75-85 infra and accompanying text.
69. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notice to absent class members is not re-
quired at this stage, nor is such notice constitutionally required. Nevertheless, due process may
require certain procedural steps, such as subclassification. Notice may then be necessary to imple-
ment these steps. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1435.
70. Id
71. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (press release in Eng-
lish and Spanish given to newspapers, broadcast media, merchants, churches, and community
centers, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp.
800 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (notice published in five local newspapers), ajf'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.
1980).
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Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 a trial court has flex-
ibility in determining the structure of the class so as to provide for ade-
quate representation of all class members' interests. 73  Two primary
means of assuring an adequate class structure are subclassification and
intervention.
Subclassification allows a court to accommodate a heterogeneous
class by, in effect, adding to the lawsuit additional parties whose inter-
ests more accurately reflect the interests of discrete groups of absen-
tees.74 The presence of these additional representatives guarantees
consideration of the interests of all class members during negotiations
and court proceedings.75
A court may appropriately use subclassification whenever it appears
that divergent views exist among class members.76 To maximize its ef-
fectiveness, subclassification should take place before the interests of
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1) authorizes the court to make appropriate orders determining the
course of the proceedings in class actions.
73. Accommodation of the two goals of a class action consent decree, a broadly defined class
for maximum binding effect and adequate representation of all interests, necessarily creates a
tension. A broadly defined class, as recommended in note 49 supra, will contain various divergent
interests. The court should anticipate potential conflicts between the class representatives and
absentee members and be receptive to motions to organize subclasses and to intervene. Failure to
recognize and accommodate the various interests should force the case to trial. See notes 79 &
135-58 infra and accompanying text.
74. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1479. The composition of the
subgroups will vary from case to case. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1341
(9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff class consisted of two consolidated plaintiff classes: one composed of
black students and one composed of Mexican-American students), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Garcia v. Board of Educ., 573 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff class consisted of a
black and Hispanic subclass and an Anglo student subclass; the defendants included the school
board and a class of parents and students who opposed any forced busing); Calhoun v. Cook, 522
F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff class consisted of three subclasses of black students); Amos
v. Board of Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 775 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (division of plaintiff class into two
subclasses, one composed of black students and one composed of white students).
75. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1350 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981). Subgroups are most likely to form during settlement negotiations, see note 79 infra and
accompanying text, as attitudes about desired outcomes are differentiated. The recognition of
separate subclasses and their representatives at that point will reduce the risk that the representa-
tive will not meet the standard imposed by Rule 23(a)(4) that the interests of the class be fairly and
adequately protected. See East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405
(1977).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) provides: "When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be con-
strued and applied accordingly."
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absent members are jeopardized." Thus, if evidence presented at a
discovery hearing shows the existence of subgroups, the court may or-
ganize these subgroups at or prior to certification. 8 In the context of
school desegregation, however, it is more likely that a class will be uni-
fied at the outset of the action, with subgroups emerging later during
settlement negotiations.79 A court, therefore, must be aware of the pos-
sibility of nonapparent subgroups throughout the proceedings.80
Intervention by absent class members complements subclassification.
If class members with different interests and viewpoints do not coalesce
into discrete subgroups, it is difficult to define subclasses clearly enough
to obtain representatives with homogeneous constituencies. Further-
more, individuals may be present who have important differences of
opinion and who cannot align with any existing subgroup. Interven-
tion by individual members is one means of accommodating these in-
terests and providing for representation of the full range of interests of
absent class members.8 '
Under Rule 23(d)(2) and (3), a trial court has largely unfettered dis-
cretion with regard to intervention. 82  Because intervenors represent
77. See notes 111-13 infra and accompanying text.
78. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1480.
79. In Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga.), af'd, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975), the
several associations claiming to speak for Atlanta's black parents agreed on the need to correct
past segregation but dramatically disagreed on the proper remedy. Some of the associations in-
sisted upon busing as a means to integrate the classrooms, but others contended that increasing the
number of black school administrators would be more appropriate. The district court ultimately
ordered a plan relying upon voluntary transfers, rather than widespread busing, to effectuate de-
segregation. See Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1975).
Because a subclass cannot effectively shield itself from the impact of a settlement in a school
desegregation case, failure to appease the subclass should force the entire case to trial. See Cal-
houn v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1973). See also notes 135-38 infra and accompany-
ing text.
80. One method by which a court can remain aware of the various class interests is by the
appointment of a "friend of the court." In the St. Louis school desegregation case, the court
appointed a disinterested attorney to represent the public interest. Liddell v. Board of Educ., No.
72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 1981) (order appointing a "friend of the court"). She has the
power to call witnesses, file pleadings, and "perform such other functions as necessary to ensure
the adequate representation of the public interest." Id See also Developments in the Law--Class
Actions, supra note 29, at 1561-65, which suggests the creation of a new court officer, an "absentee
advocate," whose task is to monitor negotiations on behalf of absent class members.
81. See, e.g., 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 1799, at 252-53. See generally 3B
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 26, 23.90[2] (2d ed. 1980); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on
Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides for appropriate court orders
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
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only their individual and possibly unique views, a class action lawsuit
quickly may become unmanageable and distorted in the absence of ju-
dicial control.83 Commentators have suggested, as one solution, that
courts establish a presumption in favor of allowing intervention.84 If
necessary, the court may limit the role of an intervenor to witnessing
court proceedings and receiving official filings and briefs.85 So limited,
an intervenor thus would serve in a "watchdog" capacity throughout
the class action.
B. Approval of the Settlement
After the court has certified the class, the parties to a desegregation
class action can begin settlement negotiations. Prior to negotiations,
however, the defendant school districts may move for the issuance of a
protective order covering the negotiation sessions.8 6 Should the court
grant the motion, 7 no litigant will be able to introduce the content of
the negotiations into evidence at trial should the parties fail to reach a
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members ... to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
come into the action; [and] (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or in-
tervenors ....
83. Unmanageability and distortion of the suit may result even though, under the current
doctrine, intervention by right is limited to those not already adequately represented in the suit.
This doctrine only ensures that a court would rebuff an attempt to intervene by each individual.
See, e.g., Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1973); 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 26, 1 23.9012]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 1799;
Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1175 (1976).
84. See, e.g., 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 26, 23.9012], at 23-1627; 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 1799, at 254; Note, supra note 83, at 1186.
85. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1485.
86. A court may issue a protective order under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which provides: "Upon
motion by a party or the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending. . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ...
See Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 1981) (order granting in part
and denying in part motions to add cross-claims and parties), in which the court in effect granted a
protective order by ordering a stay to pending motions. The court stayed the St. Louis school
board's motion to add five suburban school districts to the desegregation suit because those dis-
tricts had agreed to participate in a voluntary desegregation plan. The court also stayed any
related discovery. Both stays are effective as long as the school districts participate in good faith to
achieve an acceptable level of integration. Id
87. The party seeking the protective order has the burden of demonstrating an adequate
reason for protection. United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); Kiblen v. Retail
Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402 (D. Wash. 1977). The parties should demonstrate that free and un-
hampered negotiations will increase greatly the likelihood of settlement and that the policies
favoring settlements, see notes 31-37 supra, outweigh the need to use the negotiations as evidence.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/9
DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREES
settlement. Thus, by eliminating defendants' fear of adverse conse-
quences, a protective order would promote candid discussion during
negotiations.
If negotiations result in a settlement proposal acceptable to the par-
ties,"8 Rule 23(e) requires that all class members be informed of the
proposed settlement in a manner determined by the court and that the
court approve the settlement prior to discussion or compromise of the
action. Generally, courts fulfill the requirements of Rule 23(e) with a
four-stage process.
The first stage in the approval process is a preliminary, prenotifica-
tion hearing by the court to determine whether any obvious impedi-
ments to approval of the proposed settlement exist.89 The purpose of
the hearing is to determine not the substantive fairness of the proposal
but, rather, whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed with a for-
mal review of the proposal. 90 If the court finds no immediate obstacles
to approval of the proposed settlement, it schedules a "fairness"
hearing.91
At this juncture, the court must notify92 all class members of both the
proposal and the fairness hearing. This notice requirement serves at
least two purposes. First, notice to class members deters collusion
among parties and restricts the use of the class action as a coercive
device against absent members.9 3 Second, adequate notice ensures pro-
88. This negotiation stage undoubtedly will be the most difficult stage of the proceedings.
Examination of the requisite interpersonal interchanges and arbitration methods needed to bring
the parties to an agreement is beyond the scope of this Note.
89. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 29, § 1.46, at 53-55.
90. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 29, § 1.46, at 53-55.
91. See notes 108-13 infra and accompanying text.
92. Some courts and commentators have interpreted the mandatory aspect of Rule 23(e) as
applying to the approval requirement only, leaving the court free to omit notice in certain situa-
tions. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298, 1310 (4th Cir. 1978); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1977). See also Developments in the Law-Class.Actions, supra
note 29, at 1542 n.32. When the legal rights of class members may be compromised, as in the
school desegregation context in which a class member cannot remove himself from the impact of
the settlement, notice is constitutionally required. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
172-77 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1973).
93. Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 68 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Brookhaven Hous.
Coalition v. Sampson, 65 F.R.D. 24, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494,499-
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.RD. 481, 483 (N.D. Il. 1970).
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tection of the interests of individual class members by giving those
members an opportunity to object to the proposed settlement prior to
its approval by the court.94
Rule 23(e) does not specify the particular form and content of the
required notice. Constitutional requirements, however, necessitate no-
tice that is reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the
proposed settlement and to afford them an opportunity to object.95
Furthermore, the form of the notice should not exclude any identifiable
groups.96 In the school desegregation context, courts have held that the
normal publicity surrounding a pending suit, when supplemented with
publication of notice through the local media serving class members, is
sufficient.97 The use of "lay English,"98 or publication in different lan-
guages,99 when appropriate, often may improve the adequacy of the
notice.
The content of the notice must indicate both the subject matter of the
action and the terms of the proposed settlement to ensure that the no-
tice will adequately alert those class members with opposing viewpoints
and enable them to voice their concerns.' ° Specifically, the notice
should indicate the history of the case, t0 the members of the class, 02
94. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1214-16 (5th Cir. 1978), cer.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 912 (1971); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 68 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
95. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
96. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods. Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980) (newspaper pub-
lication, local broadcasts, and postings in local churches, community centers, and stores), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (publication in five local newspapers), afid, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980). Cf. Alaniz v.
California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269, 274 (N.D. Cal.) (newspaper publication and plant post-
ings held adequate in Title VII class settlement), modried on motion of theparies, 73 F.R.D. 289
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
98. See, e.g., Blankenship v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, No. 2186-69 (D.D.C. Jan. 2,
1973).
99. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981).
100. See, e.g., Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, Inc., 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.
1977).
101. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Wis. 1979),
af'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).




the terms of the proposed settlement, °3 the procedure for making ob-
jections,""° the date and location of the fairness hearing, 5 and, finally,
where an interested party may obtain a copy of the proposed
settlement. 16
The fairness hearing, though not mandatory, 0 7 provides absent class
members with an opportunity to assist the court in determining
whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.108
Assuming adequate notice, the absence of objecting class members at
the hearing will support a strong presumption that the settlement pro-
posal is indeed fair, 0 9 although the court must still undertake an in-
dependent evaluation of the fairness of the proposal. 1° Objectors who
appear at the hearing are entitled to develop a record in support of
their contentions, including the opportunity to introduce evidence and
cross-examine witnesses."' In deciding whether to allow discovery by
the objecting members, the court must balance the need of the objectors
for additional information against the possibility of unreasonable delay
103. Id; Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Wis. 1979),
aft'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
104. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Wis. 1979),
aj'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
105. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Wis. 1979);
af'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
106. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981).
Because it is the party with the greatest interest in obtaining a broad res judicata effect for the
settlement decree, the defendant normally must bear the costs of the required notice. Armstrong
v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 815 (E.D. Wis. 1979), af'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.
1980); 3 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTION § 6030g, at 956 (1977).
107. There is no controlling Supreme Court case describing the manner in which a court shall
receive objections or comments to a proposed settlement. In school desegregation cases, however,
courts almost uniformly hold hearings on proposed remedies, and it may well be an abuse of
discretion not to conduct one. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1348 n.8 (9th Cir.
1980), cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
108. See, e.g., id at 1348; Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 114 (7th Cir. 1976); Developments
in the Law-Class Acions, supra note 29, at 1566.
109. See, e.g., Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
110. See notes 122-48 infra.
I 1l. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing approval of a
desegregation plan because lower court failed to give objectors a "reasonable opportunity for
discovery" and an opportunity "to present sworn testimony and to cross-examine witnesses who
sponsor opposing views"). See also City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir.
1974); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973).
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in approving a sound settlement." 2
Objecting class members have, in some instances, succeeded in ob-
taining revisions of proposed settlements by way of amendments dur-
ing the hearings."t3 Regardless of the impact of the hearing upon the
settlement, the court must set forth, on the record, a reasoned response
to any objections made.' 14 Findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of the response must also appear in the record." 5
In determining whether to approve a school desegregation class ac-
tion settlement,"I6 the court should bear in mind the policies encourag-
112. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1349 (9th Cir. 1980) (trial court did
not abuse discretion in denying continuance of settlement hearing beyond one week), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981). Seealso United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679, 681 (N.D. I. 1981)
(order denying motion to intervene), in which the court said that "in school desegregation cases,
prompt resolution, through an equitable and constitutionally-acceptable settlement, allows for the
speedy vindication of the rights of minority children who have been denied equal protection of the
laws and equal educational opportunity. Where possible, these fundamental rights should be ac-
corded sooner, rather than later."
By contrast, in non-class action desegregation cases objectors must seek intervention under Rule
24 to express their dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Adams v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 628 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 487 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1973); Hines v. Rapides
Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973). Rule 24(a)(2) has a three-part test for interven-
tion as of right. Courts must allow a party to intervene if he claims (1) an interest in the subject of
the action; (2) that disposition of the lawsuit may impair his ability to protect that interest; and
(3) that his interest is not adequately represented by existing parties. The first two requirements
are virtually conceded, for "[a]ll students and parents, whatever their race, have an interest in a
sound educational system and in the operation of that system in accordance with the law." Moore
v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 298 F. Supp. 288, 293 (E.D. La. 1969). Settlement likely will
impair that interest. Representation, however, is adequate if there is no collusion between parties,
if the representative's interest is not adverse to the intervenor, and if the representative has not
failed in his duty. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973); Martin v. Kalvar Corp., 411 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1081 (N.D. Ill.
1977), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978). The fact that the parties decided to enter a
consent decree instead of pursuing the suit does not, by itself, prove collusion and adverse interest.
A consent decree does not imply that the representative failed to assert the intervenor's interests as
vigorously and effectively as the intervenor would have. See United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 466 F.2d at 575; United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp.
at 1081.
113. See, e.g., Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269,274 (N.D. Cal.), modfiedon
motion of the parties, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
114. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. Id.
116. The general equitable principles outlined in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S.
717 (1974), and Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977), indicate that a federal court
cannot invoke its powers without admission or proof of some violation of the Constitution or a
statute unless the parties have consented to the issuance of the decree. The parties' consent can-
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ing voluntary resolution of civil rights disputes" 7  as well as the"
immediate benefits offered by speedy vindication of constitutional
rights." 8  The court should also review the adequacy of representa-
tion '1 9 and the substance of the settlement proposal. As one court has
observed, this evaluation generally will require "an amalgam of deli-
cate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice."'120
A court's review of the remedy proposed in a class action settlement
differs from remedial considerations in a litigated case. 12 1 The court
must determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, reason-
able, and appropriate. 22 To reach this determination, the court may
hold evidentiary hearings'2 and may even appoint a master to assist in
its evaluation of the evidence. 24 In the course of its inquiry, however,
the court must refrain from adjudging the actual legal rights of the par-
ties or reaching the ultimate merits of the case.' 25  To do otherwise
would defeat the policies encouraging settlement of litigation.126
not, however, allow the court to order relief that it would not otherwise have the power to order.
Such a result would enable the parties to expand collusively the jurisdiction and power of the
federal courts, in contravention of the rule that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
See generaly P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-241, 309-417 (2d ed. 1973). Because a court has
the power to order both single-district and multi-district desegregation plans in those cases in
which the plaintiff prevails, see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text, it has the power to enter
such a decree upon the parties' consent.
117. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
118. See, ag., United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (order denying
motion to intervene); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Cal.), mod fedon
motion of the parie, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
119. See notes 59-85 supra and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting
Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1972)).
121. See, eg., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1980).
122. See, eg., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006,
1014 (7th Cir. 1980).
123. See, e.g., Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971); Alaniz v. California Processors,
Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269, 274 (N.D. Cal.), modfed on motion of theparties, 73 F.RID. 289 (N.D. CaL
1976); Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
124. See, e.g., Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269,274 (N.D. Cal.), modfedon
motion of theparties, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
125. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006,
1014 (7th Cir. 1980); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 456, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1974); West
Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co. 440 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Florida
Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960).
126. In Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y.), a f'd sub nom. Wesson v.
Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973), the court said:
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Several criteria guide the court's determination of the fairness, ade-
quacy, reasonableness, and appropriateness of a class action settlement.
They are: (1) the apparent strength of the plaintiff's case, balanced
against the offered settlement; (2) the ability of the defendant to per-
form the agreement; (3) the complexity, duration, and expense of con-
tinued litigation; (4) the likelihood of collusion in reaching the
settlement; (5) the reaction of class members to the settlement; (6) the
opinion of competent counsel; and (7) the current stage of the proceed-
ings and the amount of discovery completed. 27 Courts have applied
these criteria widely in the employment context 128 and increasingly in
civil rights cases. 129
Courts uniformly have regarded the apparent strength of the plain-
tiff's case as the most important criterion in evaluating a proposed set-
tlement. 30 When parties agree on a settlement prior to adjudication,
however, the court can only estimate the probable outcome of a trial on
the basis of the plaintiffs allegations, the defendant's asserted defenses,
and the costs of continued litigation.' 3 ' The court cannot finally deter-
[The Court is cautioned not to turn the settlement hearing into a trial or rehearsal of a
trial. To do so would defeat the very purpose of the compromise to avoid a determina-
tion of the sharply contested issues and to dispense with expensive and wasteful litiga-
tion. The Court's role is a more "delicate one," which requires a balancing of
likelihoods rather than an actual determination of the facts and law in passing upon
whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.
Id at 361 (footnotes omitted).
127. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 29, § 1.46, at 56; 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra note 26, 23.80[4], at 23-521.
128. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106,
1131-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes,
513 F.2d 114, 121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 864 (1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974).
129. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 804 (E.D. Wis.
1979), aJ'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
130. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 322 (7th Cir. 1980);
Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Grunin
v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 124 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974);
Fox v. United States Dep't of HUD, 468 F. Supp. 907, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
131. See, e.g., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); Protective Comm.
for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25
(1968); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 322 (7th Cir. 1980); Bryan v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Fox v.
United States Dep't of HUD, 468 F. Supp. 907, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
The court in Armstrong v. Board of School Directors recognized that even though the court
found defendants guilty of operating segregated schools, the outcome of the plaintiffs' case on the
remedial issue was by no means certain. Three school desegregation cases that were pending
[Vol. 59:1305
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mine the merits of the case without deterring settlement altogether. 132
Furthermore, insofar as the court, under this criterion, must compare
the probable remedy it would decree after full litigation with that pro-
posed by the parties, it should recognize that the remedial aspect of a
school desegregation case is far more complex than the liability as-
pect.133 In these cases, therefore, the strength of the plaintiffs case on
the issue of liability cannot be the sole criterion for evaluation of the
proposed settlement.
The second criterion, that of the defendant's ability to perform a ne-
gotiated agreement, induces the court to compare the practical effects
of a remedy that it would impose after trial with those of a settlement.
The spirit of cooperation inherent in a good faith settlement will pro-
mote the long-range success of the desegregation remedy better than
would a court-ordered remedy. 134 Moreover, one may expect the de-
fendants in a school desegregation case to agree only to a settlement
that is within their means. A remedy imposed by the court, on the
other hand, may severely tax the defendants' limited resources.
The objections of various members are also relevant to a court's ap-
proval of a proposed settlement. The objections, however, are rarely
dispositive, 35 even when raised by many class members. By definition,
subgroups pursue diverse goals, and although they generally will have
before the United States Supreme Court posed difficult questions concerning remedial plans:
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissedsub non
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980). Rather than await the
outcome of these cases, the parties decided to adjust the risk and uncertainty through negotiation
and settlement. In light of this, the court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d at 325.
132. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
133. The Second Circuit noted in United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1979),
that
[e]stablishment of liability is but the first step. The precise remedy does not follow logi-
cally from the determination of liability, but rather reflects a careful reconciliation of the
interests of the many affected members of the community and a choice among a wide
range of possibilities. "The nature of the litigation does not lend itself to complete suc-
cess by one side or the other." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D.
Colo. 1977).
Id at 576.
134. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
135. See, eg., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1358 (9th Cir. 1980) (objectors had
misconception of the law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Direc-
tors, 616 F.2d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1980) (same); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799,
803 (3d Cir. 1974) (objection by 20% of the class should not block approval), cer. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974); 7A C. WRtrHT & A. MILLER, supra note 29, § 1797.
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some common interests, more often their interests will conflict.136
Therefore, though the court should give some weight to objections, it
must also consider the probable effect of the proposed settlement upon
the interests of the class as a whole.' 37 If the proposal will adequately
correct segregative practices without infringing upon other rights, the
court should approve the settlement even if it believes the parties could
develop a more desirable plan."3
A school desegregation settlement must attain a minimum level of
compliance with the Constitution.3 9 Clearly, the court cannot approve
a settlement proposal that initiates or continues conduct illegal or un-
constitutional on its face."4 Therefore, the court must carefully scruti-




The court may either approve or reject the settlement proposal, but
cannot modify it without the consent of all parties.' 42 Whatever its de-
cision, the court must state its reasoning with sufficient detail to facili-
tate meaningful appellate review; mere boilerplate language will not
136. See, e.g., Fox v. United States Dep't of HUD, 468 F. Supp. 907, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See
also notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 326 (7th Cir. 1980).
138. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977);
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
139. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1345 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
912 (1981); Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 319 (7th Cir. 1980); Liddell v.
Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 773-74 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v.
Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. 111. 1981) (order denying motion to intervene).
The Court in United States v. Board of Educ. described its role:
This Court does not view itself as a passive receptacle for the Board's desegregation plan,
to respond in a Pavlovian way only if the bell is rung by a stated disagreement between
the Board and the United States. It has not abdicated its constitutional responsibilities,
and if the litigants were to agree on a plan that did not conform to the constitution this
Court would reject that plan and send the parties back to the drawing board.
Id at 687.
140. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1980).
141. See, eg., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (the minimum requirement
of a remedial decree is that it include "whatever steps might be necessary" to eliminate totally all
vestiges of a segregated school system); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)
(same).
The court in Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980), held that the
desegregation settlement proposal met the standard of constitutional compliance. Although the
plan did not require statistically perfect desegregation, it did require substantial desegregation
and, in so doing, went to the heart of the constitutional violations found by the district court. Id
at 326.
142. See, e.g., Burr v. Pryor, 468 F. Supp. 1314, 1316-17 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
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suffice. 143  In fulfilling this requirement, however, the court should
guard against any tendency to turn its statement of approval of the
settlement into a determination of the merits of the case.
44
The trial court's decision to approve or reject a settlement is subject
to appellate review 145 if dissatisfied subgroups desire to contest the
compromise. The scope of review, however, is narrow. An appellate
court generally will overturn approval of a settlement only upon a clear
showing that the trial court abused its discretion. 146 Such deference to
the trial court reinforces the policies in favor of settlement 47 and rec-
ognizes the trial court's familiarity with the litigants and the
143. See, e.g., Protective Comm. for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,434 (1968); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cer.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974);
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974);
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972).
144. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
145. In Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a
district court's disapproval of a settlement is an appealable order, thus resolving a split among the
circuits. Compare United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusal to
enter consent decree is appealable order); Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970) (same),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971), andIn re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation,
487 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1973) (deciding appeal of disapproval of consent decree without comment
on appealability issue) wiih Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusal
to enter consent decree is interlocutory and not appealable), ree'd, 450 U.S. 79 (1981), and Seigal
v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (same). The Court recognized that the denial of an atfirma-
tive action consent decree between employer and employees had the practical effect of refusing an
injunction and could result in "serious, perhaps irreparable consequences." 450 U.S. at 86.
Therefore, the refusal to enter the decree is appealable as an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1976).
146. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006,
1015 (7th Cir. 1980); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); Flian v. FMC Corp.,
528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Grunin v.
International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
Other grounds for reversal include plain error, Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d at 1347;
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d at 1015; failure to find
the settlement equitable and in the public interest, id; acting without knowledge of sufficient facts,
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974); Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d
689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); and failure to allow objectors to develop on
the record facts going to the propriety of the settlement, id
147. See Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972). It is
arguable, however, that this rationale is not compelling in the class action context. The impor-
tance of protecting absentee interests tempers the usual pro-settlement policy of traditional litiga-
tion. Id at 692 n.7. See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 29, § 1.21.
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proceedings. 48
II. BINDING EFFECT
The primary purpose of submitting a voluntary school desegregation
plan to a court in the form of a class action consent decree is to bind all
members of the class to the settlement and thereby avoid future litiga-
tion.14 9 This procedure allows the parties to avoid the expense of pro-
tracted litigation and to prevent subsequent collateral attack. More
importantly, the binding effect of the consent decree ensures the vitality
of the remedy by eliminating the uncertainty of relitigation and modifi-
cation of the settlement. 5 ° Furthermore, the negotiations shaping the
decree are more likely to result in a settlement when the parties know
that the product of the negotiations will have binding effect.' 5'
The policies underlying the finality of class action settlements are
consonant with the goals of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, who sought the broadest possible binding effect for such set-
tlements.'52 In a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, the conduct of the defend-
ants, by definition, affects the named class as a whole.' 53 The parties,
therefore, may settle the legality of this conduct with respect to the en-
tire class in one final action.' As a result, in school desegregation
cases courts have consistently held that intervention in the class suit,
rather than collateral attack, is the appropriate course of action for
those who object to the remedy decreed.' 55
The broad res judicata effect of class action settlements comports
with due process requirements only if the procedure employed fairly
protects the interests of absent class members.'56 Thus, if a party at-
tacking the decree shows that the class was inadequately represented,
148. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 318 (7th Cir. 1980); Ace
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1971).
149. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1400.
151. Id
152. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966).
153. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
155. See, eg., Adams v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 628 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1980); Hines v.
Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973); Black & White Children of the Pontiac
School Sys. v. School Dist, 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972).
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the decree will not be binding.'57 This exception to the res judicata
effect of class action settlements reinforces the importance of the class
certification process."'
A class action consent decree in a school desegregation case should
be immune from most changes in the law after its approval by the
court.t5 9 To permit re-evaluation of a settlement because of court deci-
sions rendered after the approval would undercut a significant motive
for settlement: the avoidance of risks created by uncertainty of relevant
legal standards. 160 Thus, a consent decree should remain in force even
if, after its entry, the Supreme Court either disallowed the use of causal
presumptions to prove segregation' 6 1 or determined that a desegrega-
tion plan permitting the continued existence of some one-race schools
is unconstitutional. 62 There are, nevertheless, limits to the effect of res
judicata. A fundamental change in the law-for example, a judicial
determination that school districts no longer have a duty to desegre-
gate-would allow defendants to argue successfully for rescission of the
consent decree on the basis of hardship. In this situation, res judicata
157. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1942); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1973).
158. See notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
159. Normally, consent decrees are modifiable only upon the consent of the parties, see, e.g.,
Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Cal.), modifled on motion oftheparies,
73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), or by the court if the decree has become oppressive. See Note,
supra note 22, at 1318. A different situation exists, however, when the government and a school
district enter a non-class consent decree that admits unconstitutional segregation. Because the
school district, by its admission of segregation, has the duty to desegregate the schools, these de-
crees are modifiable by the court upon a showing of ineffectiveness. See, e.g., United States v.
Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist., 558 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); United States v. Seminole County School Dist., 553 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
The desegregation decree should also be immune from changed factual circumstances. See
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held
that once a school board has initially complied with a court desegregation order specifying the
proportion of minority students in each of its schools, the court cannot require it to alter attend-
ance zones annually in response to demographic changes.
160. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 322 n.25 (7th Cir. 1980).
See also Bronson v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975) (absent a substantial change in
the law, desegregation plaintiffs may not relitigate issues settled by a former judgment), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
161. See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text.
162. See Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissedsub non. Estes v. Metro-
politan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980), in which the court of appeals reversed a
lower court desegregation decree and remanded the case with instructions to justify, with specific
findings, the maintenance of one-race schools.
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would not provide any greater effect than would the doctrine of stare
decisis.16 3
III. CONTENT
The appropriate content of a school desegregation plan will vary in
each case, for a plan must respond to the problems and interests of the
community for which it is intended.16 Relevant to the content of the
plan are the demographic, social, political, legal, and economic charac-
teristics of the community involved. Despite the uniqueness of each
desegregation plan, however, it is nevertheless instructive to examine
existing plans and formulate a basic structure for the content of a vol-
untary plan.
Three cities, Milwaukee, Chicago, and St. Louis, have formulated
voluntary school desegregation plans. In Armstrong v. Board of School
Directors,1 65 defendant Milwaukee school board, previously found
guilty of unconstitutional segregation, 166 entered into a voluntary set-
tlement with plaintiff class members to desegregate the school sys-
tem. 167 The single-district settlement agreement is currently in effect.
The Chicago Board of Education, without any litigation of liability,
entered a non-class action consent decree with the United States
163. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 29, at 1398.
164. See, eg., United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1979).
165. 471 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aft'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
166. Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
167. 471 F. Supp. at 813-20.
It is instructive to note that both sides engaged in considerable compromise of their original
positions in reaching agreement on a settlement plan. The parties entered the following exhibit,
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Department of Justice 68 to develop a constitutionally acceptable de-
segregation plan. The school board has now formulated and proposed
a single-district desegregation plan. 69 The St. Louis Board of Educa-
tion, found guilty of unconstitutional segregation in Liddell v. Board of
Education,'tT subsequently moved to add the suburban school districts
as defendants to the suit' 7' and proposed a voluntary, multi-district
SUMMARY (continued)
FEES $825,000 + for Substantial $550,000 plus costs
Attorney Barbee downward and expenses for
plus costs and adjustments Attorney Barbee.
expenses. required, because $300,000 plus costs
$340,000 + for of duplication of and expenses for
Attorney Charne, efforts, loss of Attorney Charne.
plus costs and appeal, risk of fur-
expenses. ther litigation, etc.
MISCELLANEOUS Racial balance Racial balance Racial balance
transfer plan shall transfer plan shall transfer plan shall
stay in effect. stay in effect, stay in effect.
Nondiscriminatory No need to men- School openings
criteria are to be tion in order as and closings and
established for covered by general locations of spe-
closing and loca- injunction. cialties will not be
tions of specialities. determined in a
discriminatory
manner.
Prohibitory and Prohibitory and Prohibitory and
mandatory mandatory mandatory
injunction will be injunction will be injunction will be
issued, issued, issued.
All students have All students have All students have
the right to attend the right to attend the right to attend
desegregated desegregated desegregated
schools. schools, schools.
168. United States v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1980) (order entering
consent decree).
169. See Student Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools, pts. 1 & 2, United States
v. Board of Educ., No. 80-C-5124 (N.D. Ill., filed April 15, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Chicago
Desegregation Plan].
170. 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aj'd, No. 80-1458 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981) (No. 80-2152).
171. Cross-Claim for Defendant, Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo., filed
Jan. 9, 1981). See note 17 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/9
DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREES
desegregation plan.'72 Five suburban school districts have agreed to
participate in the voluntary plan.' 73 The court joined eighteen non-
participating districts as parties to the suit.' 74
These three plans have similar structures despite their differences in
scope and predicating liability. The plans have three substantive com-
ponents: an injunction provision, 75 an affirmative obligations provi-
sion, 176 and a compliance provision. 77 Additionally, the plans have
implementing provisions 178 and limited durations. 179
A. Substantive Provisions
Both the St. Louis plan and the Milwaukee agreement contain in-
junctive provisions. The St. Louis plan requires participating districts
to "acknowledge a responsibility not to engage in any purposely and
intentional segregative activities"' 8 0 and to adopt procedures to pro-
hibit transfers, other than those occurring under the plan, that increase
segregation.' 8' Similarly, the Milwaukee agreement embodies two per-
manent injunctions. The first injunction prohibits the school board and
its successors, officers, and agents from discriminating on the basis of
race in the operation of the Milwaukee public schools.'8 2 The second
injunction requires racially nondiscriminatory decisions regarding
school openings and closings and the location of specialty programs. 18 3
The affirmative obligation provision in the Milwaukee settlement
mandates that defendant school board actively desegregate the public
schools. This provision obligates the school board annually to provide
all students with written notice of their right to attend a desegregated
172. See An Educational Plan for Voluntary, Cooperative Desegregation of Schools in the St.
Louis, Missouri Metropolitan Area, Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo., filed
Mar. 27, 1981) [hereinafter cited as St. Louis Desegregation Plan].
173. Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 1981) (order granting in
part and denying in part motions to add cross-claims and parties).
174. Id
175. See notes 180-83 infra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 184-204 infra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 205-15 infra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 216-23 infra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 224-29 infra and accompanying text.
180. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 7.
181. Id
182. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 815 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aj'd,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
183. Id at 818.
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school 8 4 upon request. 1 5 The school board must also assign students
within the system in such a manner that a minimum number of white
students, determined by a formula varying with the system's total and
minority enrollments, are enrolled in desegregated schools. 8 6 In addi-
tion, the school board is required to continue a pre-existing system that
permits students to transfer only when such transfers will enhance the
racial balance of the district. 87 Finally, the school board must imple-
ment a human relations program for students to aid in the achievement
of quality education and desegregation and thereby ensure the success
of the plan as an educational, social, and legal venture. 88
The St. Louis plan implements its formal commitment to desegrega-
tion by three methods. First, permissive interdistrict transfers allow
students from any participating school district to transfer voluntarily to
existing programs with available space when the transfer would de-
crease segregation. 89 The plan prohibits interdistrict transfers that
cause the white population of any school to exceed eighty-five per-
cent.190 Second, "magnet" schools with specialized formats attempt to
decrease segregation by attracting students by interest rather than by
184. The agreement defines a "desegregated schoor' as follows:
(1) Each elementary or junior high school which has a student population composed of
not less than 25% and not more than 60% black students and
(2) Each senior high school which has a student population of not less than 20% black
students and not more than 60% black students.
Id at 815.
185. Id
186. Id Application of the agreement precludes the existence of any all-white schools in Mil-
waukee; however, the formula does leave open the possibility that some all-black schools will
persist. The formula does not mandate the existence of any one-race schools, and the parties are
free to go beyond the minimum requirements of the order to eliminate all one-race schools in the
system. Id at 816.
187. Id at 815, 819-20.
188. Id at 816.
189. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 10. Three principal conditions govern
the exercise of interdistrict transfer rights: (1) the right may be exercised only when there is avail-
able space in the host school, so that no student already in the school is displaced; (2) the partici-
pating district is required only to accept transfers that do not cause the black student population
percentage to exceed 15%; and (3) the host district does not bear incremental costs of educating
the transfer students. Id at 11. Transferring students must meet the same criteria for admission
and responsibilities that apply to host district students. Id at 23.
190. Id at 14. Each participating district is required to accept as many black transfer students
as necessary to constitute 15% of the total student population in the district. The plan does not
require any school to accept more students than necessary to raise the overall percentage of blacks
in the student population higher than 25%, although a participating district could accept more
transfers than these ratios require. Id at 13-14.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/9
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geography.' 91 Third, the plan contemplates establishment of educa-
tional and quasi-educational programs to bring together students for
constructive experiences outside traditional academic settings. 192
The Chicago desegregation plan affirmatively obligates the board of
education to establish "stably integrated schools"; 9 3 that is, schools
whose enrollments of one race or minority do not exceed seventy per-
cent. 194 The board initially will use voluntary transfers of students, 95
magnet schools, 96 and adjustments of attendance areas 197 to effectuate
desegregation. In the second phase, it will make mandatory student
assignments not involving transportation. 98 As a last resort, the board
will institute mandatory assignments through busing.199 The school
board also will revise its bilingual2°° and special education 20 1 pro-
grams, magnet schools, 20 2 and general curricula 203 to coordinate with
student reassignment and to remove bias.2°
All three desegregation plans create monitoring committees to super-
vise the implementation of the programs. The committees' authority
191. Id at 10. The magnet schools have a different transfer policy than the permissive in-
terdistrict transfers. Students are chosen from applications for the schools on a first-come, first-
served basis subject to two priorities. Black students who live in the City of St. Louis have the
highest priority; black students in predominately black districts have the second priority. Id at
18-19.
192. Id at 10. The educational and quasi-educational programs include programs at cultural
institutions and libraries. Id at 21-22.
193. A school is considered stably integrated under the plan if its enrollment is 30 to 70%
white or 30 to 70% minority and has some history of stability. Chicago Desegregation Plan, supra
note 169, pt. 2, at 3.
194. Id pt. 2, at 3.
195. Id pt. 2, at 4-5. The plan encourages voluntary transfers if the transfer will enhance
desegregation at the receiving school and not adversely affect it at the sending school. Id pt. 2, at
3.
196. Id pt. 2, at 5-6. Magnet schools have ethnic and racial goals of 15 to 35% white and 65 to
85% minority students. Id
197. Id pt. 2, at 6.
198. Id pt. 2, at 7. Mandatory assignments not involving busing include the pairing of two
contiguous schools. Id
199. Id pt. 2, at 8. The consent decree from which the desegregation plan was developed, see
notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text, provides that "mlandatory reassignment and trans-
portation, at Board expense, will be included to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other
techniques are insufficient." Chicago Desegregation Plan, supra note 169, pt. 2, at 8.
200. Id pt. 1, at 51-58.
201. Id pt. I, at 39-50.
202. Id pt. 1, at 29-34.
203. Id pt. I, at 9-28.
204. Id pt. 1, at 26.
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ranges from adjudicative to advisory and reflects the degree of the
school districts' prior liability for segregation.0 5
The compliance provision of the Milwaukee settlement agreement
establishes a monitoring panel consisting of lay members and a United
States magistrate. 06 The school board must submit to the panel re-
ports of the racial composition of the schools.2"7 In addition, individ-
ual class members may file noncompliance reports with the panel,
which will investigate and correct any deficiency. Finally, the magis-
trate alone may review any school board decisions affecting desegrega-
tion. The board, however, retains a right of appeal to the district
court.
20 8
The St. Louis plan creates a coordinating council, composed of rep-
resentatives from each participating district and the state, 20 9 to oversee
and coordinate the plan.210 Specifically, the council will adopt proce-
dures to disseminate information about the plan; to report regularly to
the participating districts, the parties, and the court; and to resolve any
disputes among the participating districts or the parties.3
The Chicago plan establishes a desegregation monitoring commis-
sion with a racial and ethnic composition proportionate to that of the
student population.2 12 The commission will monitor the activities of
the desegregation project and evaluate and provide recommendations
concerning the progress of desegregation to the Board of Education.1 3
Additionally, the plan establishes advisory panels of parents and
205. The Milwaukee plan is predicated on a judicial determination of liability for segregation.
Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aJ'd, 616 F.2d 305
(7th Cir. 1980). The monitoring committee has both an advisory function and an adjudicative, or
dispute resolving, function. See notes 206-08 infra and accompanying text. The court found the
St. Louis school board guilty of segregation, Liddel v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.
Mo. 1980), aft'd, No. 80-1458 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1981), cert denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Dec. 1,
1981) (No. 80-2152), but none of the suburban districts has litigated the issue of segregation. The
St. Louis monitoring committee has an advisory function and a limited dispute resolution func-
tion. See notes 209-11 infra and accompanying text. The Chicago Board of Education has not
litigated the issue of segregation, and its monitoring committee has no dispute resolution function.
See notes 212-15 infra and accompanying text.
206. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 813, 816-18 (E.D. Wis. 1979),
aft'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
207. Id
208. Id
209. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 27.
210. Id
211. Id at 28.
212. Chicago Desegregation Plan, supra note 169, pt. 1, at 105.
213. Id pt. 1, at 103.
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students and of community organization representatives2 14 to facilitate
public participation in the planning and implementation of the deseg-
regation program.215
B. Implementing Provisions
Because the parties negotiated the Chicago and St. Louis plans
before judicial determination of unconstitutional practices,216 both in-
clude disclaimers of any liability by the school districts.217 The possi-
bility of including such a disclaimer gives plaintiffs significant leverage
in negotiations, for the ability to avoid litigation of liability is a major
incentive for a school district to enter a voluntary desegregation
plan.21 8 The presence of a disclaimer of liability in a consent decree,
however, should neither preclude the court from imposing continuing
obligations on a defendant as part of the settlement219 nor affect the
214. Id pt. 1, at 86.
215. Id pt. 1, at 83.
216. The St. Louis multi-district plan is not predicated on liability because the five participat-
ing suburban school districts have never litigated the issue. See note 205 supra.
217. See Chicago Desegregation Plan, supra note 169, pt. 2, at 22 ("[n]othing in the Consent
Decree, the Resolution adopting the plan, or the Plan, or in the public discussion draft of the Plan,
constitutes any acknowledgement of any constitutional or statutory violation by the Board [of
Education]"); St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 35 ("[i]f during any phase of imple-
mentation of the plan.. . the parties to the case or any participating districts were to withdraw
for any reason, they would have and be deemed to have maintained, and not in any way waived
by participation in this plan, all legal rights, legal arguments or defenses to be made in their behalf
that they now have").
For cases involving consent decrees with disclaimers of liability outside the school desegrega-
tion context, see Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 327 (1928) (antitrust); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (housing
discrimination), afl'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1038
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (employment discrimination), aft'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978).
218. See, e.g., EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aft'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1977), cerl. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), in which the court said:
[A] disclaimer of liability is, of course, a standard feature in consent decrees. The de-
fendant denies that it has done anything wrong, then promises not to do it again. Never-
theless, it is clear that the failure of a party to a consent decree to admit liability for
alleged misconduct does not affect the validity of the consent decree itself. ... The
instant defendants candidly admit that the absence of proof of actual discrimination and
their denial of such discrimination are immaterial. They rightly point out that very few
consent decrees would be negotiated if an admission of liability by the defendants was a
sine qua non.
Id at 1038 n.16.
219. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311,327 (1928); Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 850-51 (N.D. Ill. 1979), af 'd, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
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court's jurisdiction over the action.220
Both the St. Louis plan221 and the Milwaukee settlement agree-
ment222 are expressly conditioned upon the approval of the consent de-
crees as proposed. The plans are void if the courts decline to adopt the
proposed consent decrees.2 23 The purpose of these contingency clauses
is to assure the parties of judicial approval and protection before they
make any binding commitments.
The duration of the desegregation plans is limited in all three cities.
In Milwaukee, the settlement agreement is to remain in effect for five
years.224 The Chicago Board of Education intends complete imple-
mentation of its plan within two years.225 By contrast, the St. Louis
plan has two three-year phases. The first phase is designed to decrease
emphasis on litigation by gradual withdrawal from the lawsuit,226 with
a concurrent increase in emphasis on education and on cooperation
among participating districts.227 At the end of the first phase, the par-
ticipants will review the experience of the previous three years and pre-
pare a second three-year program. 228 The parties will present the
program to the court and, upon approval, will implement it as the final
phase.229 Until that time, school districts may withdraw from partici-
pation at any time.
220. See, eg., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311,327 (1928), Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 850-51 (N.D. Ill. 1979), a 'd, 616 F.2d
1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
221. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 34.
222. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 815 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aft'd,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
223. Id; St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 34.
224. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 818 (E.D. Wis. 1979), atd,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
225. Chicago Desegregation Plan, supra note 169, pt. 2, at 21.
226. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 34. During the first phase, the parties to
the case would refrain from any discovery connected with the interdistrict aspect of the desegrega-
tion lawsuit except for appeals already pending. Id at 36. During the first year, the St. Louis
Board of Education would withdraw its motions to add suburban school districts as parties to the
case. During the second year, the Board would drop its motions entirely. Id at 36-37.
227. Id at 36-38. The participating districts would accept the affirmative obligations provi-
sions of the plan during the first year, see notes 189-92 supra and accompanying text, seek avail-
able space for at least half the students desiring to transfer to other districts, and establish two
magnet programs. The next year, the districts would try to place all the remaining students who
wish to transfer and would create additional magnet programs. During the third year, the districts
would establish any additional magnet schools and review the experience of the first phase of the
program. St. Louis Desegregation Plan, supra note 172, at 36-38.




School districts planning to enter into a class action consent decree
for desegregation may wish to model their plans after the Milwaukee,
Chicago, and St. Louis plans. The injunctive provision provides a basis
for protection against future claims of segregation because the school
district must refrain from further segregative acts. The compliance
provision monitors school district actions and also provides a method
for arbitration of any disputes concerning desegregation.
Parties should tailor the affirmative obligations provision in a con-
sent decree to address community needs. The district court approved
the Milwaukee agreement, finding it fair, adequate, reasonable, and ap-
propriate,230 even though the plan does not require "statistically per-
fect" desegregation."' Expert witnesses predicted, however, that the
plan would achieve substantial desegregation.232 Under the plan, not
only does every student in the district have the right to attend a deseg-
regated school, but no white student is insulated from attending school
with substantial black enrollments.1 3 In the absence of a prior deter-
mination of liability, a school district may obtain judicial approval of a
plan without ensuring that no white student is insulated from attending
a desegregated school. Such assurance would depend, rather, on the
present racial composition of the schools, residential patterns, and com-
munity desires.
Limiting the duration of a desegregation consent decree is both rea-
sonable and attractive. The res judicata effect of a class action settle-
ment provides certainty and assurance to the parties during
negotiations and avoids unwanted modification of the settlement after
court approval. On the other hand, this binding effect could be
counter-productive if it commits the parties to a plan that subsequently
becomes obsolete in light of future changes in the legal, demographic,
or political climate of the community. A limitation on the duration of
the agreement may be the most acceptable compromise, because it
would allow for reassessment of the otherwise binding plan at the end
of a specified period of time. After negotiating one plan, the parties'
230. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 809 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aft'd,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
231. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 323 (7th Cir. 1980).
232. The court heard various experts testify as to the projected minimum and maximum effect
of the desegregation plan. The court noted that attainment of the maximum effect was unlikely
without implementation of a voluntary metropolitan area remedy. Armstrong v. Board of School
Directors, 471 F. Supp. 800, 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aj'd, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
233. See note 186 supra.
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experience and familiarity with relevant procedures should enable
them to negotiate a subsequent plan with little difficulty in the event
segregation persists.
IV. CONCLUSION
Voluntary school desegregation through class action consent decrees
is a viable and effective means of desegregation for many communities.
The class action procedure has inherently adequate safeguards to allow
maximum community participation and to protect individual constitu-
tional rights.234 Because of this community participation, the plan
finally adopted will be generally compatible with the needs and desires
of the entire school district. In addition, the plan ultimately will be
more successful than a court-ordered remedy because of the commu-
nity support and confidence implicit in its adoption.235 Finally, several
incentives, including the avoidance of protracted litigation, assurance
against future lawsuits, and the possibility of prompt and peaceful inte-
gration,236 motivate school districts to participate in voluntary desegre-
gation plans. School districts faced with desegregation litigation
should consider class action consent decrees for voluntary desegrega-
tion as an alternative to defending interminable, and often bitter,
lawsuits.
Kathleen Snyder Schoene
234. See notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text.
235. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
236. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
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